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Time is out of joint: permanently so, it seems. What struck Walter Benjamin with 
such force nearly a century ago in borrowing Klee’s image of the Angelus Novus—
the angel’s eyes are cast back over centuries of historical ruin as he is flung into the 
future by paradise’s tempest1
In this regard, consider how Thomas Kuhn’s once novel thesis of disrup-
tive—or eruptive—scientific revolutions has effectively replaced the idea of conti-
nuous historical development.
—is for us familiar, all too familiar. Life without inter-
ruption, or a smooth, homogeneous life-experience is differentiated by a multitude 
of group identities, and a periodized biography. Whether in response to, or as a con-
tributing factor in, the modern fact of a fragmentary, divided time, history is theo-
rized as such. 
2
[T]his history is one of innovation and proliferation rather than monarchic suc-
cession ... Instead of the analogy of a succession of political regimes or scientific 
theories, each triumphing on the ruins of its predecessor, imagine [the history of 
objectivity being akin to] new stars winking into existence, not replacing old ones 
but changing the geography of the heavens.
 Whether adopted in the work of a particular histo-
rian or rejected in the name of a different model of historical change, at the very least 
the Kuhnian model serves as a touchstone for all subsequent histories; it bulks par-
ticularly large for those who would undertake to write a history of science after 
Kuhn. 
Implicitly, it is Kuhnian history that Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison have 
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Imagining the firmament of scientific history dotted with all different theories both 
past and present is a challenging response to Kuhn, for whom each new theory 
burns so brightly as to blot out all that precede it. Again, with Kuhn implicitly in 
mind, Daston and Galison write: “In contrast to the static tableaux of paradigms and 
epistemes, this is a history of dynamic fields, in which newly introduced bodies re-
configure and reshape those already present, and vice versa.”4
Just as in the case of the avalanche, preconditions must coincide with contingent 
circumstances ... Rather than razor-sharp boundaries between periods, we 
should therefore expect first a sprinkling of interventions, which then briskly in-
tensify into a movement, as fears are articulated and alternatives realized—the 
unleashing of an avalanche.
 
Though they would rework the specifics of a Kuhnian, disruptive history to 
include a multitude of scientific theories within a changing, dynamic landscape, 
Daston and Galison nevertheless conceive of the advance of historical time as irregu-
lar; throughout the book, their preferred metaphorical image of historical change is 
that of the avalanche. 
 
5
Later, in discussing “mechanical objectivity” as the episteme, ethos, and guiding 
principle of scientific practice in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, Daston and Ga-
lison again imagine the icy convulsions of historical change: “Like the spring melt of 
an ice-bound northern river, the change begins with a crack here and there; later 





Trading in metaphors of revolutionary versus avalanche-like historical 
change serves a purpose: it hones the language by which the historian reports on his 
or her findings. In the social sciences, and in theory in general, clarifying terms is in 
many ways an end in itself. Yet, re-fashioning the terminology of an older theoretical 
model to fit different data, while useful, also tends to be something of a distraction. 
Clarifying the model of historical change distracts those who would theorize par-
ticular, disjointed histories from the more embracing issue of the ethics of such theo-
rization. Let us be clear on this last point. There will be inter-historical ethical ques-
tions that arise within a field of social, scientific study. For example, in writing a his-
tory of the American Civil War, ethical questions will almost certainly arise concern-
ing race and the institution of slavery. Yet, these are not the ethical issues that face 
the modern historian as historian. For their part, Daston and Galison acknowledge 
the ethical questions that arise within their chosen fields of study, namely, the bio-
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logical and physical sciences. They note, for example, the seeming “heartless[ness] of 
technocrats” and the “indifferen[ce]” of scientific objectivity to “familiar human val-
ues.”7
In concluding the text, Daston and Galison reflect, briefly, on the larger ethi-
cal import of their own history: “To claim that there are multiple virtues, be they ep-
istemic or moral, is very different from the claims that all virtues (or none) are equal-
ly well- (or ill-) grounded and that whim may decide among them.” By historicizing 
scientific epistemologies, and thereby multiplying their epistemic virtues, Daston 
and Galison conceive of their history as preparatory to, but absent from, the ensuing 
ethical debate of such virtues. As far as the ethical tasks, responsibilities—or even, 
questions—that face the historian given her epistemology (of historical time as dis-
jointed), and given the practices that emanate from and articulate that epistemology 
(e.g., framing a history of objectivity in terms of the images that illustrate scientific 
atlases over time), Daston and Galison are unequivocal: “All history can do is to 
demonstrate the possibility of alternatives,” which is to say, in matters of epistemic 
virtues, “history ... clarif[ies] what they are, how they work, and how much hangs in 
the balance if one is obliged to choose among them.”
 Daston and Galison raise the specter of ethical failings within the science just 
long enough to set them aside in the name of conducting a (Foucault-like) historical 
study of scientific norms and practices. 
8
But there is great ethical potential in an historical epistemology that treats 
time as disjointed or fragmentary; Benjamin’s unique sense of the messianic, for one, 
 
It is this last set of claims that causes hesitation: “All history can do” is to 
show an episteme as it is; all history can do is to demonstrate which practices follow 
from the ethos of a particular episteme; all history can do is present, without decid-
ing, the ethical import of an episteme and its attendant virtues. History as a social 
scientific discipline is thereby exempted from the questions that confront a science 
when its epistemology is historicized; in short, history is conceived of as disinte-
rested, non-evaluative, and therefore as an objective observation and reportage of 
facts as they are given in the historical record. In this way, the historian with one 
hand unsettles the seeming givenness of objectivity as a fixed or grounding scientific 
principle, and unsettles it by way of its historicization, while with the other hand re-
cuperates into history itself a basic or founding objectivity: in the name of disconti-
nuous historical time, objectivity is dissolved in a field of social, scientific study only to be 
precipitated out again in the discipline of history itself. Consequently, the value-laden 
choices and the virtues and practices that grow out of an historical epistemology get 
covered over. In other words, questions concerning the ethical implications and en-
tanglements—and, more importantly, the ethical responsibilities and possibilities of 
doing history—are skirted. 
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attests to the ethical potency of such an epistemology. Here it is instructive to follow 
a different approach to answering the question of the ethical task and promise of 
doing modern history. Further, it is instructive to do so by availing ourselves of the 
same Kantian and Foucauldian resources Daston and Galison employ in their own 
historical study. After all, it is in part through his engagement with the Kantian no-
tion of critique that Foucault is led, methodologically, toward a historical genealogy. 
In turn, though it is unacknowledged, it is by a kind of Foucauldian genealogy that 
Daston and Galison conduct their study of the virtues and practices of the biological 
and physical sciences. 
What Foucault gains by this methodological turn to genealogy, and what he 
lacked in his archaeology, is a means of coordinating his theorization of a particular 
field of knowledge with the practices that define and articulate that field: the interac-
tion between the practices being theorized and their (practical) theorization is trace-
able through a genealogical method in a way that is not possible for an archaeology.9
We need look no further than ourselves to find out how history has settled in-
to such a state. It is through the lens of modern subjectivity that we view history; it is 
from the same, subjective vantage that history shows up in its modern disfigure-
ment. The modern subject is active—or characterized by “spontaneity [Spontaneität]” 
in the Kantian sense—it is self-determining, autonomous, self-reflexive, and yet it 
remains opaque to itself upon reflection. To date the arrival of this modern self is to 
look back into the written philosophical record and note the terminological drift to-
 
Given Foucault’s insight into how knowledge and power are related, an ethics of 
theory follows naturally from the preceding, epistemological point: the interaction 
between theorized practices and their theorization is not ethically neutral; again, a 
genealogy is methodologically keyed to the ethical consequences of theory in a way 
that archaeology is not.  
To begin our brief reconstruction of the ethics of theory in general—and the 
ethics of history in particular—we must first insist on the modernity of such history 
since it is based upon the modern epistemological view of historical time as disrup-
tive, disjointed, and out-of-sync with itself. Historical time in disrepair now seems to 
be a settled matter; what has lapsed since Benjamin discerned this structure a cen-
tury ago is its vibrancy. No longer do we survey history in the stark hues of Klee’s 
reds, blues, and sharp angles. We are instead awash in grey news-copy famines, pla-
gues, wars, and/or natural catastrophes; or, more simply, the high-gloss arrhythmia 
of digital media. With the entrenchment of an historical epistemology comes a quiet-
ism concerning the questions raised by that epistemology and a diminishment of its 
possible claim on us: change and disruption are learned by rote; they are unthin-
kingly treated as synonymous with historical time. 
                                                 
9  Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” Translated by D. F. Bouchard & S.  
Simon. In The Foucault Reader. Edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984). 76- 
100. 
Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 96-104. 
100 
 
ward a recognizable objective/subjective distinction: as is the case with all linguistic 
histories, so too with “subject” and “object” the change is gradual. While Descartes, 
writing in the mid-seventeenth century, continues the traditional, scholastic usage 
according to which “object” refers to a mental artifact—a concept or representation 
in the mind—a hundred years later, in the pages of Kant, “subject” as referring to 
cognitive and/or perceptual operations and faculties is clearly distinguished from 
the “object” as the shared reference of such operations for all rational beings. 
In making their case that changes in ideas and practices of subjectivity inform 
changes in the ideas and practices of scientific objectivity, Daston and Galison note 
that by the mid-nineteenth century, “dictionaries and handbooks in English, French, 
and German credited Kantian critical philosophy with the resuscitation and redefini-
tion of the scholastic terminology of the objective and subjective.”10
The mid-nineteenth century historical record bears out this development in a 
number of ways. For instance, there is suddenly a new literary genre; or, at least, a 
marked change in the tone of an older genre. What appears at this time is the intel-
lectual biography of “the scientist, der Wissenschaftler, le scientifique”
 The implication 
is that changes in the textual or linguistic record correspond with extra-discursive 
changes in society in general (it is just this transition from discursivity to extra-
discursive practices that Foucauldian genealogy tracks). Just as subjectivity and ob-
jectivity are written about differently in texts from the end of the nineteenth century 
compared to how they are addressed in texts from the beginning of the same period, 
so subjectivity and objectivity are experienced, lived, or practiced differently by the 
generation that spans the same time period. 
In invoking Kant’s idea of an active, willful subject to make the correlative 
point that scientific objectivity, as it is modernly understood and practiced, is histor-
ically situated—and only recently acquired—Daston and Galison avail themselves of 
part of Kant’s modernism while neglecting another, related part: an active or “spon-
taneous” subject is for Kant also a self that is concealed from itself. For Daston and 
Galison, Kant’s notion of a self-determining subject prefigures what they term the 
“scientific self,” which appears in the mid-nineteenth century (at just the moment 
the Kantian terminology of subject and object enters into the official, textual record). 
Once Kant has drawn the distinction between what is merely subjective in the cogni-
tive and perceptual operations of human beings, and what is objective in those same 
operations and as such verifiable, epistemologically warranted, and communicable, 
the scientist’s task is to diminish by strength of will the former in the name of the 
latter. 
11
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 as self-
disciplined, steel-willed, and self-abnegating. Consider the following excerpt Daston 
and Galison provide from an 1878 British guide to research methods in physics and 




chemistry: “[The will is] the strong central authority in the mind by which all its 
powers are regulated and directed as the military forces of a nation are directed by 
the strategist who arranges the operations of a war.”12 Such an idealized image of the 
scientist as self-denying and (militarily) self-disciplined is absorbed into the practic-
es of the common, laboratory under-laborer. Meticulous journals are now kept, with 
detailed record not only of the objects of study but of the state of the observer; Das-
ton and Galison reproduce a page from the Sudelbücher—or “waste books”—of the 
scientist, poet and philosopher Georg Christoph Lichtenberg: observations of 
changes in barometric pressure are woven into reflections on Lichtenberg’s own 
mental and physical state.13
As rooted in Kant as these developments in (scientific) subjectivity are, still 
there is a crucial piece of the Kantian story that is overlooked: it is just this missing 
piece that accounts for the way history appears to us moderns; it is this same piece 
that problematizes the idea and practice of an objective history (and makes apparent 
the ethical task that confronts the historian). At precisely the juncture in the Critique 
of Pure Reason from which one can extract the (modern) notion of an active and ref-
lective subject, one also finds Kant insisting on the opacity of such subjectivity to it-
self. In acknowledging an active self as the condition of the possibility of a unified 
object of experience, Kant is careful to situate such a subject at the inaccessible level 
of the transcendental; this is the significance, in Kant, of identifying the self as the 
“transcendental unity of apperception.”
 
14
Stepping back from the Kantian trees in which it is all too easy to lose the for-
est, what follows is that if modern objectivity is rooted in the Kantian critical project, 
it is so at the considerable price of a ready and complete access to the object. Given 
 
The representation of an object (of experience) as a synthetic achievement ra-
ther than as an empirical given is rooted in a self that is itself a synthetic achieve-
ment. Yet, as the transcendental condition of the possibility of an object (of expe-
rience), the synthesis of the unity of apperception cannot itself be conditioned. As 
unconditioned, the synthetic unity of apperception is not determinable, that is, it is 
not cognizable or knowable to consciousness. All objects of experience are thus 
tinged with a degree of opacity, which is inherited from the opacity of their tran-
scendental condition; Kant in this way inclines toward empiricism and away from 
the rationalist, Leibnizian hope that objects might be fully determined (or cognized) 
by thought alone. To put the same point in more familiar Kantian terms, an object (of 
experience) is for Kant an appearance; the object as it is in-itself is not knowable (just 
as/because the self as it is in-itself is unconditioned and thus unknowable). 
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the opacity of the self to itself—and here we should recall that Freud, a century later, 
will have Kant in mind in developing psychoanalysis—if an object is approached 
through the lens of modern subjectivity it will appear with just the same imperfec-
tions that mar the lens. This same disfigurement marks every possible object on 
which the modern observer would turn a probing eye. Given our present interest in 
the study of historical time by history as a social, scientific discipline, we can specify 
the preceding conclusion: historical time appears to history as disjointed, dis-
articulated, or incomplete just because it is viewed through and from the vantage 
point of the modern subject. The great tragedy—or comedy, depending on one’s 
Nietzschean sensibilities—of modern life is that the subject becomes acutely self-
interested at the very moment of falling into obscurity to itself. 
The first generation of nineteenth-century modern theorists was unaware, to 
various degrees, of the significance of all of this for theory itself. For instance, Kant 
conceives of the Critique of Pure Reason methodologically as a process of reason sit-
ting in self-judgment. In at least this one important respect, Kant is thus blind at the 
time of the first Critique to the broader theoretical exigencies of his own account of 
subjectivity: critique as a methodology of reasoned self-reflection must need be fru-
strated by the same obscure fate that faces modern subjectivity. Later modern theor-
ists—and Kant himself by the end of his career—come to appreciate the theoretical 
(or methodological) problems that arise from the idea of a (Kantian) transcendental 
subjectivity. In response to Kant, Nietzsche and Marx exemplify the modern theorist 
in working out, in their own distinct ways, theoretical models adjusted to the mod-
ern realities of subjectivity, time, and society. And here we should note one further, 
more recent close-reader of Kant: Michel Foucault. 
Like Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx before him—to all of whom Foucault dedi-
cates an early, eponymous essay15—Foucault acknowledges the great theoretical po-
tential of Kantian critique; with these same early modern theorists, Foucault also rea-
lizes that critique in its traditional, Kantian form is no longer viable given the differ-
ent structure of modern, historical time.16
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 By privileging practices and techniques 
over discursive formations, Foucault replaces in theory the Kant-like regulative 
ideas that modern sciences and institutions erect on grounds that have been razed 
by a process of analysis and critical investigation. What Foucault instead attends to 
in his genealogical approach is site- and time-specific phenomena that resist the 
(temporally) pre-modern approach of most discursive analyses. Leaving aside the 
formidable theoretical challenges that in turn confront a study of historically si-
tuated practices and norms, it here suffices to note that in a genealogy both the ob-




ject of study and the means of its study are specific, deeply contextualized, and loca-
lized in time and place. As might be expected, the ethics of theorizing in this fashion 
is comparably site-specific and particular in its focus. 
Thus, the ethical burden we shoulder as theorists with a new, modern 
epistemology of history—one that treats historical time as a fractious, unsteady ad-
vance from past into future—is that of the specific, particular, or individual. The fo-
cus of Foucault’s genealogical studies bear out this point; the late works occupy the 
space between an uneven, disjointed history, the imperatives that accrue in the in-
terstices of historical time, and the ethical possibilities open to those who have 
slipped into those dead spaces. Texts like Discipline and Punish and The History of 
Sexuality also aim to fit the resources available from the western, intellectual tradi-
tion into the margin (and in so doing empower those who have been marginalized 
by the [un]steady advance of history). 
At the level of theorizing modern, historical time and its attendant systems of 
knowledge and regimes of power, Foucault moves in his later work from an arc-
haeological retrieval of the discursive traces of change left in the knowledge systems 
of the sciences to a genealogy of the practices of those same systems. What Foucault 
gains in this methodological change is a theoretical proximity to his particular field 
of study and, more importantly, a way of gauging the intrusion of his own theoreti-
cal practices into whichever topic is under investigation. Though Foucault would 
appeal to the language of knowledge and power to describe the theory-level implica-
tions of his genealogical approach, the language of an ethics of theory seems equally 
apt given the point at which Foucault arrives at the end of his career. We might, ac-
cordingly, read Foucault’s interest in the ancient practices surrounding the hupom-
nemata as self-referential: if there is an ethics of the self being practiced in this ancient 
writing perhaps it reflects the ethics of writing about such matters in an historical 
study of antiquity.17
An epistemology that treats of historical time as disjointed, demands, as 
noted above, a matching theory that is sufficiently pliable to adjust to the uneven 
terrain of such a history. A theory like Foucauldian genealogy reflects such pliability 
in its value-bias toward what is local, specific, or marginal. To put the same point in 
the above Kantian language, a genuinely modern theory attends to what is con-
cealed or obscured in its field of study; a modern theory approaches what is liminal 
within a particular field of knowledge or what tends toward and anticipates a differ-
ent set of practices and norms. In short, marginality and difference are the epistemic 
virtues of all modern theory as modern. Given the very insubstantiality of the notion 
of the marginal by which a modern, theoretical epistemology operates, the ethics 
that attends modern theory is normatively biased toward adopting alternate theoret-
ical approaches and re-orienting historical studies by various different arrangements 
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of site- and time-specific practices. Again, we see just this point being practiced in 
Foucault’s late works: the move from studying incarceration in the early modern pe-
riod to Victorian-era practices of sexuality to the ethics of self-care in late-antiquity 
attests to an ongoing ethical concern with how one theorizes history. 
By keeping the theory-level, ethical implications of social, scientific study 
alive in this way, Foucault avoids darkening still further the obscure corners and 
blind-spots that form within an historical time in disrepair. Whatever ones sensibili-
ties are about the dangers of letting whole sections of historical time fall into obscuri-
ty—and with them, the populations that occupy those times—it is nevertheless true 
that in adopting a modern epistemology of uneven historical time one is ethically 
committed to just those times and those populations. Here, then, is the real ethical 
danger of practicing history in an objective guise while appropriating an historical 
epistemology that is anything but objective: Daston and Galison in their history sev-
er a modern epistemology from its ethical implications (while still attending in their 
study to site- and time-specific historical practices). Specifically, what Daston and 
Galison fail to realize in their objective history (of objectivity) is that only a non-
objective history avoids presenting theory as ethically neutral. Our modern situation 
is such that our subjectivity, our history, our claims of knowledge and our social 
practices are all obscure; the ethical responsibility of the theorist in the face of this is 
to pay constant (and vigilant) attention to her own contributions to such obscurity. 
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